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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
(1)

Is an unsigned minute entry a final judgment or

order from which an appeal can be taken?

If not, may a party

move to set aside the apparent ruling reflected in the unsigned
minute entry?

If so, are there any time constraints in doing so

Or must a party wait until the Court has executed a written orde
on the matter set out in the minute entry?

And if the court

refuses to set aside the unsigned minute entry and thereafter
makes the ruling of the minute entry a judgment by signing and
filing an order to that effect, may a party appeal said action
within thirty (30) days after entry or filing of that order under
Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P.?
(2)

Where the parties have stipulated, through their

respective counsel, that the pretrial hearing should be stricken
and continued without date until the parties have completed their
desired discovery or until either party requests a pretrial
conference, and such stipulation is on file before the court, and
also communicated orally to the trial judge twice with his
approval, may the trial judge properly dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice and on the merits when neither attorney
and neither party appear at a pretrial conference from which they
have been orally excused by the trial judge from attending, and
when said pretrial conference was scheduled by the Trial Court
Executive one month after the stipulation to remove the case from
the pretrial calendar had been filed?
(3)

May the court dismiss with prejudice and on the
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merits the Plaintiffs1 complaint when the Plaintiffs' attorney
does not appear at a pretrial hearing?

Does the fact that the

attorney had talked to the District Judge a few days prior to the
pretrial hearing and had been told by the District Judge that he
did not need to appear have any bearing on the issue, either in
law or equity?
(4)

Should the case be remanded for completion of

discovery and trial, or should the dismissal be without
prejudice, with provisions tolling any statute of limitations
problems caused by the dismissal and the need to refile?

Or

should the dismissal with prejudice and on the merits be
affirmed, despite the frequently stated standard that lawsuits
should be disposed of on their merits and not by way of default?
(5)
prosecute?

Should the case be dismissed for failure to

If so, with or without prejudice?

What effect on

that determination would facts showing Defendants responsible for
most delays, such as refusing to submit to depositions, obtaining
protective orders, failing to answer "Interrogatories", and
refusing to complete a verbal settlement agreement, etc. have?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
•I.

-i

wmi

.umi •ftm

n
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This is an appeal from an order of the District Court
of Beaver County dismissing the Plaintiffs1 complaint with
prejudice and on the merits when neither party appeared for a
pretrial conference on June 18, 1984, and from the denial of
Plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the dismissal.

The parties had

previously filed with the Court a stipulation to vacate the
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scheduled pretrial hearing and to not reschedule another pretri
hearing until the parties completed their discovery or until
either party filed new request for a pretrial hearing.

The

parties had also obtained the prior oral consent of the trail
judge to be absent from the June 18, 1984 hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs are Charlie Brown, his wife Carma Browr
and their Nevada corporation, Charlie Brown Construction.

The

Defendants are Conrad H. Koning, his wife Amy J. Koning, their
Nevada Corporation, Leisure Sports Incorporated, and various
associations formed to manage property sold in their subdivision
at the Mt. Holly ski resort in Beaver County, Utah.

The

Plaintiffs will sometimes be referred to collectively as "Mr.
Brown" or the "Browns", while the Defendants will sometimes be
referred to as the "Konings". The Konings are the developers of
the ski resort area.

The Browns are the purchasers and owners of

certain lots at the Mt. Holly ski resort, and filed a complaint
to force Konings to complete road improvements that they
allegedly represented would be done at their expense.
The facts to support Browns1 appeal in this case are
not in dispute.

The "Affidavit of John L. Miles" filed February

25, 1985 in support of the Browns "Motion To Set Aside Dismissal"
was not challenged by the Konings at the hearing held March 18,
1985.

Further, Browns attorney proposed to take the stand and

present sworn testimony to support the facts outlined on pages
2-10 of the transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing (See
T. 2: 6-8, also, T. 9: 17-20), but the Court accepted the
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statement of facts presented by Browns1 attorney as if under
oath, and the Konings did not care to challenge those facts (See
T. 10: 13-17).

Thus, the undisputed facts, as outlined in the

transcript of the March 19, 1985 hearing (T. pp. 2-19) and as
reflected in the pleadings, is substantially as follows.
The Browns complaint was filed on June 15, 1981.
Service of process was accomplished pursuant to Section 57-11-20,
UCA, 1953, as amended.

Konings filed a demand that Browns,

non-residents of Utah, post a non-resident cost bond.
was posted and Konings answered.

The bond

Browns1 attorney scheduled the

taking of Mr. Koningfs deposition for June 14, 1982. The Konings
attorney requested, and the Browns attorney granted, an extension
to July 9, 1982. On July 8, 1982 Mr. Maycock, Konings1 attorney,
telephoned Browns' attorney and stated that Konings would not
appear at their deposition because a protective order had been
issued in the United States Federal District Court allowing
Konings to refuse to answer questions concerning the Mt. Holly
Ski Resort. A "Motion For Protective Order" was filed the next
day, July 9, 1982, which stated that the United States District
Court for the District of Utah has issued a similar protective
order.

The scheduled depositions were therefore not taken.
On April 4, 1983, Browns' attorney caused certain

"Interrogatories" to be filed with the District Court. These
interrogatories were mailed to Scott Thorley, Konings1 attorney.
Mr. Thorley had previously filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
for Konings, but no action had yet been taken by the Court on
that motion.

Mr. Thorley apparently did not forward the
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"Interrogatories" on to Konings1 co-counself Mr. Maycock, to be
answered, as Mr. Maycock later informed Browns1 attorney that he
had not received the interrogatories.
There being no court activity shown by the record in
the case for seven months, the Court, sua sponte, issued an
"Order To Show Cause" and also set a date for a pretrial hearing
both scheduled to be heard on March 19, 1984.

Prior to March 19

1984 the attorneys for the parties discussed the case and the
unanswered "Interrogatories".

An agreement was reached and, due

to time constraints, was communicated by telephone to District
Court Judge J. Harlan Burns the morning of March 19, 1984, so
that neither party would need to appear at the pretrial hearing.
This agreement, or stipulation, was subsequently reduced to
writing and filed with the Court on April 19, 1984. A
transmittal letter dated March 19, 1984 was filed with the Court
on March 22, 1984, and refers to the telephone call to Judge
Burns and to the agreement made.

That agreement, or stipulation,

allowed Konings1 attorney thirty more days to answer the
"Interrogatories" and goes on to state:
"3. That this matter should be stricken from the
Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties have
completed their discovery or until either party
requests a Pre-Trial Conference."
On April 16, 1984, just 3 days before the above
stipulation was filed with the Court by Konings1 attorney, the
Court continued the pretrial hearing for 60 days.

On April 30,

1984 notice was mailed out getting the matter for trial on June
18, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Browns' attorney telephoned
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lelinda Kessock, the Trial Court Executive, and informed her of
the agreement or stipulation (which by that time, was in the
court file) to continue the matter until the parties had
completed their discovery and requested a pretrial hearing.
However, instead of vacating that date, she mailed a
notice changing the June 18, 1984 date from a trial to a
pretrial.

On June 15, 1984, Browns1 attorney contacted Judge

Burns on behalf of both attorneys (See "Affidavit of John L.
Miles", paragraph 9, also, see T. 17: 21-23) and explained the
agreement to continue the pretrial until either party requested a
pretrial, and further informed the Court that the parties had
worked out a settlement between themselves (See Exhibit P-8).
This was done so both attorneys could be excused from attending
the June 18, 1984 pretrial and to inform Judge Burns of the
reason why neither attorney would appear on that date. Judge
Burns stated there would be no need for the attorneys to appear
under those circumstances.
But, when no one appeared on June 18, 1984, the minute
entry reflects that the case was dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits. The Court apparently overlooked the stipulation in
the file and had obviously forgotten the conversation of June 15,
1984 with Mr. Miles in St. George, Utah.

On June 28, 1984, the

clerk of the Court mailed an unsigned minute entry indicating a
dismissal with prejudice and on the merits. This minute entry
did not come to the attention of Browns' attorney until sometime
in January, 1985 (T. 7: 15-24, T. 8:14-17).

Efforts were made to

consult with Judge Burns on the matter and with Konings1
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attorney (T. 8:18-25), who had in the meantime asked to withdraw
as Konings1 attorney (the Court had taken no action on that
request).

These efforts were fruitless (See Exhibit P-13, also,

T. 9: 1-4).
The Browns then moved, on February 20, 1985, to set
aside the dismissal by the unsigned minute entry.

A hearing on

that motion was held on March 18, 1985. The District Court
denied the motion and affirmed the dismissal with prejudice and
on the merits (See orders dated March 27, 1985 attached in the
Addendum).

These orders were filed April 4, 1985.

Plaintiffs

appeal those orders.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Browns seek to have the dismissal with prejudice and oi
the merits reversed and the case remanded for further discovery
and then trial on the merits pursuant to the stipulation.

Browns

contend that an unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment or
order from which an appeal can be taken and therefore argue that,
despite the delay between the minute entry and the motion to set
aside the minute entry order, that this appeal in timely taken
from the subsequent order signed by the Court and filed April 4,
1985.

Browns assert that the case should not have been dismissed

when neither party appeared for the June 18, 1984 pretrial
because (1) the parties had signed a stipulation that was then in
the Court file in which the parties agreed to vacate the pretrial
hearing until discovery was completed or until either party
requested a pretrial hearing; and (2) that the trial court Judge,
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, excused both parties and their
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attorneys from attending the pretrial conference, but simply
forgot that he had done so when the case was called.

Further,

that a dismissal under such circumstances should not, in any
event, be "with prejudice" and should not be denominated as "on
the merits".
Browns also claim that the lower court erred in
excluding various exhibits offered to substantiate the facts
supporting their motion to set aside the dismissal. Browns
attack the finding that setting aside the dismissal would cause
the Konings "substantial prejudice".

Finally, Browns seek

attorney's fees for the prosecution of this appeal.

ARGUMENTS
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN<DENYING APPELLANTS1
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL.

I.
A.

AN UNSIGNED MINUTE ENTRY IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT
OR ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN. THE
COURT CANNOT DISMISS THE COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 41,
URCP, WITHOUT A MOTION FOR DISMISSAL BY THE
DEFENDANTS.
Rule 58A(b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is

determinative on the issue that an unsigned minute entry is not a
final judgment or order.

Rule 58A(b) requires that ". . .all

judgments shall be signed by th£ judge and filed with the clerk."
Rule 58A(c) states that "A judgment is complete and shall be
deemed entered . . . when th© same is signed and filed as herein
above provided."
In Wisden v. City of Salina, (Utah, 1985) 696 P.2d
1205, the district court had granted summary judgment in favor of
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the City of Salina.

Like the record in this case from the June

18, 1984 minute entry until the order of April 4, 1985 following
the hearing on Browns motion to set aside the minute entry
dismissal, just as in Wisden,

"No judgment or order signed by

the judge as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b) and (c) appears
in the record.11

The Supreme Court, in Wisden, held that:

"An

unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final judgment."

Se

also, Wilson v. Manning (Utah, 1982) 645 P. 2d 655.
Thus, Browns could not have taken an appeal from that
minute entry even if its existence had been discovered sooner.
Since the minute entry was in Konings favor, their attorney
should have prepared the proposed order and served the proposed
order of dismissal on Browns counsel pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) of
the District and Circuit Court Rules of Practice.

If that had

been done, Browns' counsel could then have filed objections, and
the mistake and confusion would have been resolved quickly.

This

procedure is essential to properly "file" a judgment for the
purposes of taking a proper appeal Larsen v. Larsen (Utah, 1983)
674 P.2d 116) .

The reason this procedure was not followed is

obvious—Mr. Maycock knew it would be contrary to the stipulation
he had signed and that it would not be fair to Browns.
Therefore, upon discovering the minute entry, Browns
counsel moved to set aside the purported order of dismissal. The
new attorney for the Konings resisted the motion at the March 18,
1985 hearing, despite the stipulation by Konings prior attorney,
and the Court refused to set aside the dismissal.
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This appeal

was then timely taken from the order filed April 4, 1985, which
basically affirmed the minute entry.
Rule 41(b), Utah Pules of Civil Procedure, is
determinative of the issue of the courtfs authority, sua sponte,
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

That rule requires the

Defendants to move for dismissal, and does not authorize the
court to dismiss without such a motion by the Defendants. No
such motion was made by Defendants, rather, Defendants stipulated
to a continuance of the pretrial in order to complete discovery.
In all of the following cases under Rule 41(b), a motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute had been filed:

Westinghouse

Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc. (Utah,
1975) 544 P. 2d 876; Polk v. Ivers (Utah, 1977) 561 P. 2d 1075;
Utah Oil Company v. J.D. Harris (Utah, 1977) 565 P. 2d 1135; and
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., (Utah, 1977) 571 P. 2d 1368.

In all

four cases, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was an abuse of
discretion.

The grounds for setting aside or vacating the order

of dismissal by minute entry is even more compelling in this case
than in any of the four cited cases because (1) the parties in
this case stipulated to an indefinite continuance in order to
either settle or complete discovery; (2) the Court was advised of
this on at least two occasions,, and approved the stipulation or
at least the effect thereof; (3) neither party showed up for the
pretrial conference, and it is manifestly unfair to inflict all
the penalty on Browns, the Plaintiffs; (4) no motion for a
dismissal for failure to prosecute was ever filed by the
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Defendants, and this is a prerequisite to a dismissal under Ru!
41(b), URCP.
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is
instructive on the issue of whether the dismissal in this matte
which operates against the Plaintiff like a default judgment
operates against a Defendant, should be set aside for good caus
shown by the stipulation and by the District Judge's approval o
the stipulation.

The following cases support the policy that

default judgments and dismissals should be set aside to allow a
trial on the merits where any reasonable excuse is offered:
Westinghouse, supra, and Locke v. Peterson 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P
2d 1111.
In Westinghouse, the Supreme Court observed that:
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatc
and to move calendars with expedition in order to kee{
them up to date. But it is even more important to ke*
in mind that the very reason for the existence of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice between them. In conformity
with that principle the courts generally tend to favoi
granting relief from default judgments where there is
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse
party.w
Westinghouse, was a case dealing with a Rule 41(b) motion to
dismiss filed by the Defendant.

The Konings never filed such a

motion—on the contrary, their attorney stipulated to vacate the
pretrial hearing so that he would have time to complete
discovery.

This is a position just the opposite of a motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute—it is an agreement to delay th
matter for Konings own benefit of trial preparation.
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The

Westinghouse court also stated that:
w

It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the
business of the court with efficiency and expedition
the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward according to the rules and
the directions of the court, without justifiable
excuse. But that prerogative falls short of
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result in
injustice."
The dismissal in this case was arbitrary action taken against
only the Browns without a motion to dismiss being filed as
required by Rule 41(b), especially when, in fact, both parties
failed to appear for the pretrial hearing.

Further, there was

ample uncontroverted justifiable excuse based upon (1) the
stipulation signed by both parties; (2) the settlement that had
apparently been reached by the parties? and (3) the consent
obtained from the trial judge to be absent from the hearing.

B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
WHEN NEITHER PARTY APPEARED FOR A PRETRAIL
CONFERENCE BECAUSE THE PARTIES HAD OBTAINED
THE COURT'S PERMISSION TO BE ABSENT AND HAD
FILED A STIPULATION TO POSTPONE THE PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE.
In discussing the upcoming pretrial hearing, Browns1

attorney reminded Konings attorney that he needed to answer some
interrogatories (T. 4: 1-5)• Upoh discovering the confusion over
the interrogatories, an agreement was reached that Konings
attorney would have thirty (30) more days to answer or object to
those interrogatories.

Since these interrogatories and other

discovery needed to be completed, by both parties, it was agreed
that the pretrial should be vacated until the discovery
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was finished.

According to that agreement, a "Stipulation

Regarding Interrogatories" was prepared and signed by both
attorneys,

John B. Maycock signed it for and on behalf of his

clients, the Konings.
Although not signed by the Konings, this stipulation
was signed by their attorney acting for and on their behalf.
Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code provides:
"An attorney and counselor has authority:
(2) To bind his client in any of the steps of an actic
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk 01
entered upon the minutes of the court, and not
otherwise."
The Konings have denied that their attorney was authorized to
stipulate to any delay in court calendar (see paragraph 6 of the
"Affidavit Of Conrad Koning And Amy Koning In Opposition To
Motion To Set Aside Dismissal" filed March 18, 1985 on the day o
the hearing).

This self-serving declaration carries no weight,

as the statute expressly authorizes their attorney to bind them
by a stipulation filed with the Court, as was done. Having
agreed to a settlement, and then having learned that they might
avoid the price of that settlement because of a mistaken
dismissal, the Konings now claim there never was any settlement
and that their attorney did not have authority to stipulate to
any delays.
In 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys At Law, page 207, it states:
"An attorney of record has implied authority to do
everything necessary and proper in the regular and
orderly conduct of a case, provided his acts affect the
remedy only and nqt the cause of action. . . .
"During the progress of a trial, an attorney of record
has implied authority to enter into stipulations and
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agreements respecting matters of procedure, as
distinguished from the cause of action itself. Among
other thingsf an attorney of record may stipulate to
advance the date of hearing, to continue the case, or
to waive a jury trial.n
In United States v. Berney (1983, CA10 Utah) 713 F.2d 568, the
court said that delays do not warrant dismissal for failure to
prosecute where the delays (late filing of memorandum) is not
prejudicial to the parties in light of a continuance by
stipulation.
Not only was there a stipulation in this case, but it
was approved by the Court as well.

Since the stipulation had to

be mailed to Salt Lake City for Mr. Maycock to sign, and then had
to be returned to Beaver, Utah for filing with the Court, Browns1
attorney caused a copy of the transmittal letter to Mr. Maycock
to be filed with the Court as a reminder to the Court Clerk and
to the trial judge of the agreement that had been reached,
communicated to the trial judge, and approved by him.

The letter

clearly establishes that the agreement had been approved by Judge
Burns.

This letter was filed with the Court on March 22, 1984,

some three months before the dismissal, so it is credible
evidence that the facts therein stated actually occurred.

These

facts are also established by the long distance telephone charges
shown on Exhibit P-2.

The stipulation itself was filed later on

April 19, 1984.
Again, on June 15, 1984, Browns1 attorney, acting at
the request of Mr. Maycock, again informed Judge Burns of the
agreement to vacate the pretrial, with the additional reason that
the parties had informed counsel that they had reached a
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settlement.

Again, the evidence is unrebutted that the Court

approved and excused both parties from appearing at the pretri
conference.

If there had not been some such agreement, surely

the Konings attorney would have been present.

Judge Burns, wi<

his heavy case load (T. 18: 13-17), simply forgot the
conversation and did not look in the file before dismissing th:
case when no one appeared on June 18, 1984, Even in the absenc
of the stipulation and the trial court's approval, to impose a]
the sanctions for failure to appear on one party, thereby
benefiting the equally guilty other party, is unfair and
inequitable.

Under these circumstances, it would be a

miscarriage of justice to allow the dismissal with prejudice an
on the merits to stand.

C.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE DISMISSAL BE "WITH PREJUDICE AND ON
THE MERITS".
A dismissal with prejudice and on the merits implies

that the trial court considered the merits of the complaint
itself and found that the complaint did not state a cause of
action, or that the causes of action therein stated had no meri
However, the complaint adequately sets forth three causes of
action, each well plead and sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.
In the case of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, I
Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the complaint was in limt
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from June 5f 1950 to May 28, 1958, when a motion was made to
dismiss for lack of prosecution.

The Supreme Court said:

". . . Since any party to this action could have
obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any
time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally for
a number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for
the court to grant respondents1 motion to dismiss with
prejudice."
It must be repeated that the Konings never made any motion to
dismiss—quite the contrary, their attorney had stipulated to a
continuance to allow himself more time to complete discovery.
The dismissal was a gift of the Court, one that their attorney
would not, or at least did not, follow through on to obtain a
written judgment or order because that would obviously be
contrary to his stipulation.

No such compunction bothered the

Konings or their new attorney at the hearing on the motion to set
aside the dismissal on March 18, 1985.
In another Utah case, Utah Oil Company v. J.D. Harris,
supra, the issue was whether or not a lapse of 16 months in
prosecuting a claim for relief was sufficient to support a
dismissal with prejudice, particularly where the pretrial hearing
was stricken because the parties had apparently reached a
compromise settlement, which, as in this case, did not come to
fruition.

There, the court held:
w

. . . this court has been active in that area and has
held that where all of the litigants had power to
obtain relief and failed to do so, it is error to
dismiss with prejudice. None of the defendants
requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial conference
or trial as was mandated by the court previously when
the pre-trial was suspended by reason of settlement
negotiations.
"Applying the foregoing rules to the case at hand, it
is obvious that plaintiff's lack of diligence in
19

prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably excusable ii
light of the settlement efforts and had defendants bee
anxious to proceed they need only have taken such
affirmative step themselves. Also, no prejudice to
defendants' position is evident while serious injustic
may well exist as a result of the dismissal."
To the same effect is Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., supra. The
long standing rule is that, whenever possible, controversies
should be resolved upon their merits and not by way of default s
that the parties are given their day in court.

Relief from a

default judgment is addressed to the court's sound discretion,
but that discretion is to be exercised freely and liberally
Nounnan v. Toponce 1 Utah 168; Westinghouse, supra; Locke v.
Peterson, supra; and Cutler v. Haycock 32 U. 354; 90 P.2d 897.
The court cannot act arbitrarily in the denial of a
motion to set aside a default judgment, but should be generally
indulgent so that disputes can be settled advisedly and in
conformity with law and justice, and it is an abuse of discretio
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the failure to appear Mayhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951.
Where there has been a stipulation signed by both
parties that the pretrial hearing be vacated until discovery is
completed or until either party thereafter requests that a new
pretrial conference be scheduled, and neither party thereafter
files such a request, and the trial court approves the
stipulation, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss the case
when neither party appears at the pretrail conference from which
they have been excused.

Further, it is an abuse of discretion tc
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dismiss "with prejudice and on the merits", since such dismissal
is obviously not on the merits*

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE WOULD OCCUR IF THE DISMISSAL WERE
SET ASIDE. THAT FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN.
Following the hearing held March 18, 1985 on the motion

to set aside the dismissal by the minute entry, the court
thereafter signed an "Order Denying Motion To Set Aside Order Of
Dismissal" (this order is attached, see Addendum) which states
that the trial court found that substantial prejudice would occur
if the motion were granted.
trial court.

No such finding was made by the

The court's findings are contained in the

transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing beginning at the bottom
of page 20 and continuing through,to the end on page 26. No
where in that transcript does the court ever state any finding at
all concerning substantial prejudice.
addressed.

The subject is not even

Although the Konings were present at the hearing,

they did not present any testimony.
The only support for such a finding is contained in the
Konings affidavit filed March 18, 1985, wherein they state that
substantial prejudice would occur because they had sold their
shares in Leisure Sports, Inc. However, even if they had sold
their shares, which was not established at the hearing or found
as a fact by the trial court, it still would not cause
substantial prejudice since Leisure Sports, Inc. is also a
defendant in this lawsuit.

Further, since no proper final

judgment or order of dismissal had been entered as required by
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Rule 58A, U.R.C.P., the defendants, and any purchaser as well,
were not entitled to rely upon a minute entry dismissal, even
assuming they knew about the minute entry and relied upon it,
fact which again was not found by the trial court as part of t
decision making process.
Although for some unknown reason it does not appear
the transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing, Mr. Pussell
Gallian, who appeared at that hearing as the attorney
representing the Konings and Leisure Sports, Inc., told the co
that he, Russell Gallian, was the purchaser of the Konings sha
in Leisure Sports, Inc. No testimony was offered on this poin
just a statement by Mr. Gallian.
finding regarding this.

Again, the court made no

Browns counsel cannot explain its

absence from the transcript, and understands that this court c,
take no action on a matter not in the record.

However, if tru<

and if as Konings affidavit states "the Konings1 Buyers (i.e.,
Mr. Gallian) relied on this dismissal as part of their decisioi
to buy the stock of the corporation.", then a serious and obvic
conflict of interest exists.

If the status of this matter was

misrepresented to Mr. Gallian by his clients, the Konings, thei
he has a claim against the Konings that would preclude him fror
representing the Konings before the court on the motion to set
the dismissal aside, since,if the court does set it aside, thei
the burden of Browns complaint may fall on Mr. Gallian as the
purchaser.
On the other hand, if Mr. Gallian simply looked into
the matter, saw the minute entry dismissalr and relied only upc
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that, then there has again been no substantial prejudice, since a
minute entry is not a final judgment or order pursuant to Rule
58A, U.R.C.P., and Mr. Gallian especially, as an attorney, would
not be entitled to rely upon an unsigned minute entry.
Thus, if this court reverses the order of dismissal and
remands the case for trial, it should order that Mr. Gallian, if
he is the purchaser of the Konings shares, cannot represent
Konings due to the obvious conflict of interest.
There being absolutely no findings at all concerning
any prejudice, that portion of the order filed April 4, 1985
should be stricken.
III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING VARIOUS
EXHIBITS OFFERED TO SUPPORT THE MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL.
At the March 18, 1985 hearing, the court excluded

exhibits offered by Browns to support their position that the
minute entry order should be reversed.

The court improperly

excluded Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8, P-14, P-15, P-16.
Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7 were offered to
show that the delays in moving the case forward were more the
fault of the defendants than the Browns. They deal with
difficulty in scheduling the deposition of the Konings, which was
never taken because they had a protective order and would not
appear for a deposition.

These exhibits should have been

received, and should be considered by this court on appeal. See
Westinghouse, supra, regarding the conduct of both parties and
the opportunity each party had,to move the case forward.
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Exhibits P-3 and P-8 were offered to show that
settlement negotiations were commenced early in the case and th<
were being actively pursued immediately prior to the minute ent
dismissal on June 18, 1984. These exhibits should have been
received and should be considered by this court on appeal. See
Utah Oil Company, supra, regarding the effect of settlement
negotiations on such a dismissal.
Also, Exhibit P-8 was offered as proof of the
stipulation and agreement concerning discovery, showing that
Konings attorney expected to "proceed with the discoveryw if
settlement of the case was not possible.

This exhibit should be

received and considered by this court on appeal.
Finally, Exhibits P-14, P-15, and P-16 were offered tc
show reasonable excuse or neglect on the part of Browns1 attorne
in not learning of the minute entry dismissal for a period of si
months.

These exhibits should also be received and considered b

this court, although they should make no difference, since
a minute entry order is not a final judgment or order, and if
Konings attorney had prepared a written order for the court's
signature and served it upon Browns1 attorney as required by Rul
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice, Browns would have then been abl
to object and move to set aside the minute entry order, even if
the delay had been much longer.

The Rules of Practice require

that opposing counsel be served with the proposed order and give:
five (5) days to object before it is submitted to the judge for
signature.
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IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED ON REMAND
TO PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR THE
DEFENSE TAKEN ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DISMISSAL. THE DEFENSE IS A VIOLATION OF
THEIR STIPULATION. SUCH A DEFENSE IS WITHOUT
MERIT AND IS NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH UNDER
SECTION 78-27-56 OF THE UTAH CODE.
The Konings have taken the position that their

attorney, John B. Maycock, was not authorized to enter into the
stipulation vacating the pretrial conference in order for
discovery to be completed.

This stipulation was for the benefit

of the Konings, as well as the Browns, to enable both parties to
take depositions and do other discovery work.

It also gave

Konings an additional 30 days to answer the interrogatories,
which were way past due. Without it, Browns attorney could have
appeared at the pretrial conference and asked for sanctions for
Konings failure to respond to the interrogatories.
Konings a defense is not taken in good faith. When the
stipulation was largely for the benefit of Konings, and served
their purposes at the time, they should not be allowed to
repudiate it later, when it no longer serves their purpose, just
because the trial judge dismissed, the lawsuit when he forgot that
he had excused the attorneys from appearing at the pretrial
conference and failed to notice, the stipulation or the letter
filed March 22, 1984 that were then in the court's file.
When a defense is asserted without good faith and
without merit, the court is*authorized by statute to impose
attorneyfs fees to the prevailing party.
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Section 78-27-56

of the Utah Code provides that:
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by
statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action i
without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith."
As has already been discussed in Point I (B) earlier in this
brief, Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code gives an attorney
authority to bind his client by an agreement filed with the
court.

This was done. Konings actions in denying that agreerrn

are not asserted in good faith, and this court should award
attorney's fees to Browns for the attorney's fees incurred to
enforce that agreement.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the orders of the lower coi
which denied relief from the minute entry and dismissed the
Browns' complaint with prejudice and on the merits.

The case

should be remanded to the district court for trial and for a
determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to
Browns to enforce the stipulation agreement.
Respectfully submitted this

7^

day of September,

1985.

^ ^ ^ : ft&^
J0HN L. MILES
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellan
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the Q.1-K day of September,
1985, I hand-delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the
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above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Russell J. Gallian,
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for Defendants, at One South
Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building, St. George, Utah 84770.

retary
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IN UTAH A N D DISTRICT Oh COLUMBIA

March 1 9 , 1984

F 0i E1
MAR 2 2 1984

John B. Maycock
Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re:

Charles Brown Construction Co, et al vs. Leisure Sports,
Inc., et al Civil No. 4318

Dear Mr. Maycock:
I reached Judge Burns by telephone this morning before he took
the bench and explained our agreement to him. He said that it
would be fine with him.
Enclosed are copies of the Interrogatories and a stipulation we
should file to reflect the agreement we made. If you will sign
it and return to me in the stamped envelope enclosed, I will fil#
it with the Court.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter in getting the case
back on track. For the past year I thought you were in default
on the answers to the interrogatories while you thought my client
was not prosecuting the case.
Very truly yours,

John L. Miles
Attorney At Law
JLM:jr
cc:

Judge J. Harlan Burns'
Beaver County Clerk

EXHIBIT #

y i P. P !i>
WRIGHT & MILES
By John L. Miles
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 North 300 East
P.O. Box 339
St. George, UT 84770
Phone: 628-2612

APR 1 9 1984

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., A Nevada Corporation,
CHARLES BROWN, and CAPMA BROWN,

STIPULATION REGARDING
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
vs,
LEISURE SPORTS, I N C , A Nevada
Corporation, WEST VILLAGE UNIT
#1, MT. HOLLY RECREATION
COMMUNITY, CONRAD H. KONING, and
AMY KONING,

Civil No. 4318

Defendants.
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, by his attorney, John L. Miles,
and Defendants, by their attorney, John B. Maycock, and
stipulate:
1.

That Plaintiff's INTERROGATORIES filed on or about

March 23, 1983 and mailed to Scott Thorley, Defendants1 former
attorney, but not mailed to John B. Maycock, Defendants1 present
attorney, have herewith been submitted to John B. Maycock.
2.

That Defendants should have 30 days from the date

hereof to either answer said INTERROGATORIES or to make whatever
objections or response thereto as Defendants deem appropriate.

EXHIBIT #

n O •>

3.

That this matter should be stricken from the

Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties have completed their
discovery or until either party requests a Pre-Trial Conference.
4.

That the Order To Show Cause should be stricken.

DATED this < P 3

day of March, 1984.
WPIGHT & MILES

damn L. Miles
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that; I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing STIPULATION REGARDING
INTERROGATORIES to John B. Maycock Esq., Attorney At Law, at 175
South West Temple, #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to John
B. Maycock, Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta, 50 West Broadway, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101, on this $DjtfL&&y J*^ March, 19J

Secretary

'
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CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION
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John B. Maycock

John L. Miles
[[^tttDTre^

frppgaftfll
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JUUDXEE J- Harlan Burns

WSFQftiWft

€W3Mi. Paul B. Barton

BNIUfflF J&gUy B, PavJS

PWOCfflDBNG

LEISURE SPORTS, INC., et al

zmsfflt

B, Rav .Chris tiapasn.

Pre-Trial Hearing

mmm. mim

JMSiMffi.

This matter was called on for hearing for a
Pre-Trial Conference.

No one appeared on

behalf of either party.

This matter had

been set several times for pre-trial and
no one had ever appeared.

The Court ordere

the matter dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.

The minute entry will serve

3s the Order of Dismissal.

A copy is to- bd

mailed to the respective parties,

ftfltiutteBsirifcNUiD-

EXHIBIT # _

GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
Russell J. Gallian
Attorney for Defendant
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. O. Box 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

]
1|
1
]>
>

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SET
SET ASIDE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL

'1

Civil No. -W2- ^5/5*

vs.
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED,
et. al.
Defendants.
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter filed its Motion to
Set Aside this Court1s Order of Dismissal on February 20thf 1985.
The matter was brought before the above-entitled Court on Monday,
March 18, 1985, in conjunction with regular Law and Motion calendar.
The Court reviewed the complete file, reviewed Affidavits, Motions,
and Memorandums filed by the Plaintiff, together with the Affidavit
of Konrad and Amy Koning
officers

of

the

(the former principal shareholders and

Defendant)

and

considered

the

arguments

of

respective counsel for the parties, and the Court noting the long
delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside and finding that substantial

EXHIBIT a
R8/9

-

prejudice would

occur

if the Motion were granted; and fur

finding that the Plaintiffs' counsel was notified of the Dismi
shortly after June 28, 1984, and has admitted that his of
received such notice and took no formal action with respect to
case until the filing of their Motion that is the subject matte:
this ruling;
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS as follows:
That

the

Plaintifffs

Motion

to

Set

Aside

the

Order

Dismissal is hereby denied.
DATED this

CTL

day of March, 1985.
BY THE COURT

J/jSaflmjBur n i
istrict /Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foreg<
document was mailed, postage prepaid this

x5

day of Ma.

1985, to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit;

John Miles, Esq.
60 North 300 East
St. George, Utah 84770

•Secretary

-2-
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JALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL
lussell J. Gallian
Vttorney for Defendant
3NE SOUTH MAIN STREET
3IXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. 0. Box 1339
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

]
!i
|
)

ORDER AFFIRMING
DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED,
et. al.

>

Civil No. -Wir'

Defendants.
THE COURT having duly noticed the above-entitled matter for a
pre-trial on June 18, 1984, and the Court having previously entered
pre-trials and Orders to Show Cause why the case should not be
dismissed, and no parties having appeared on the date set by the
Court, and the Plaintiff having failed to prosecute the action, and
the Court having previously directed the Clerk to enter a dismissal
of the above-entitled action with prejudice and on the merits,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Court as follows:
That the Minute Entry dated June 18, 1984, is hereby affirmed
and that the signature of the Court below shall serve as the final

R8/8

EltiiHIT#

Order With respect to this matt
DATED this

/ /

da

Y

o£

////<f4-//?/ '

1985

BY THE COURT

Sums
district Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true ana correct copy of the foregoi
document was mailed, postage prepaid this

> Q *~

day of Marc

1985, to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit?

John Miles, Esq.
60 North 3Op East
St. George, Utah 84770
U^Tf^X

^Secretary
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SEP 131985
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
k

CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., a Nevada Corporation,
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN,

,c,

°0

Supreme Cow t (Jtih

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 20645

vs.
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY
RECREATION COMMUNITY, CONRAD H.
KONING, and AMY J. KONING,
Defendants-Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the 9th day of September,
1985, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to the law offices of Russell J.
Gallian, GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for Defendants, at
One South Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building, in St. George,
Utah 84770.

«rohr. L. Mi ] es
Attorney For Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, postage prepaid, to

1

Russell J. Gallian, GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for
Defendants, at One South Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building,
St. George, Utah 84770 this 11th day of September, 1985.

£gmx\ L. Miles
Attorney For Defendants

2

